Background

Charlotte Rogers Barrett, individually and as beneficiary and current trustee of the Charlotte Rogers Barrett Trust, sued eleven defendants in Bexar County Probate Court No. 1, including three family members who had served as trustees of two trusts established thirty-five years ago. Barrett alleged the trustee-defendants breached fiduciary duties by making self-serving investments of trust assets in family-run business entities they controlled through ownership of managing member or general partnership interests. The petition sought trust modification, monetary damages, judicial dissolution of Las Racias Land Company, L.P., attorney's fees, and declaratory relief regarding trustees' use of trust funds for litigation expenses.

Defendant Marcus T. Barrett, IV removed the case to the Business Court on August 14, 2025, arguing the court had jurisdiction under sections 25A.004(b)(1), (2), (5), (7), and 25A.004(e) because the suit "directly regard[ed] the governance and internal affairs" of corporate defendants, included derivative claims, alleged breaches of fiduciary duties owed to partnerships, and sought judicial dissolution under the Business Organizations Code. Plaintiff timely objected, contending removal was improper because section 25A.006(d) authorizes removal only from district court or county court at law—not statutory probate court—and that all claims arose from trust administration under Title 9 of the Property Code.

The Jurisdictional Analysis

Judge Barnard conducted a statutory construction analysis, emphasizing that subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the court's power and that the Business Court's jurisdiction is established entirely by statute. The court focused on section 25A.004(g), which expressly provides:

Unless the claim falls within the business court's supplemental jurisdiction, the business court does not have jurisdiction of . . . (2) a claim arising out of: . . . (E) Chapter 53 and Title 9, Property Code[.]

The court concluded that "the claims asserted by the plaintiff arise out of Title 9 of the Property Code," bringing them squarely within the statutory exclusion. Because section 25A.004(f) requires "agreement of all parties to the claims and a judge of the division of the court before which the action is pending" for supplemental jurisdiction to attach, and because "the parties disagreed," the Business Court lacked jurisdiction. The court sustained plaintiff's objection and ordered the case remanded to statutory probate court.

Implications for Texas Commercial Practice

This decision establishes important boundaries for Business Court jurisdiction in cases involving trusts and business entities. Even when trust disputes involve corporate defendants, derivative claims, governance allegations, and requests for judicial dissolution—all matters that would ordinarily fall within the Business Court's core jurisdiction—the statutory carve-out in section 25A.004(g) controls if the claims fundamentally "arise out of" Title 9 of the Property Code. The court rejected defendant's attempt to recharacterize trust administration claims as governance disputes, applying a straightforward "arising out of" analysis focused on the source of plaintiff's claims rather than the identity of the defendants or the relief requested.

The opinion also confirms a procedural limitation on removal: section 25A.006(d) authorizes removal only from "district court or county court at law," not from statutory probate court. This creates a strategic asymmetry—parties cannot use removal to escape specialized probate court jurisdiction even when business entities are involved. For practitioners, Barrett underscores the importance of careful pleading and forum selection in cases at the intersection of trust law and business disputes, and confirms that the Legislature's express jurisdictional exclusions in section 25A.004(g) cannot be circumvented through artful characterization of claims or parties.