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Hon. Stacy Sharp
Judge · Seat 4B
Texas Business Court · Fourth Business Court Division (San Antonio)
Biography
Stacy Rogers Sharp sits in the Texas Business Court’s Fourth Division, which covers 22 counties in South Texas extending from the border south of Laredo to coastal Aransas County. Judge Sharp’s background in commercial litigation derives from her private practice as an appellate lawyer and trial-litigation consultant in civil suits that included contractual breaches, unfair competition, banking disputes, corporate-governance and fiduciary litigation, energy matters, employment law, and intellectual-property matters. She has long served on the faculty of the University of Texas School of Law, having most recently taught advanced writing for litigation. Her publications and papers cover the topics of fraudulent transfers, trade secrets, oil and gas litigation, business torts, rhetorical techniques for handling counterarguments, and the Texas Civil Participation Act. She is former president of the Federal Bar Association’s Austin Chapter and sits on its San Antonio Chapter’s executive board. A 2006 graduate of the University of Texas School of Law, she was a Chancellor, a Teaching Quizmaster, and member of the Texas Law Review. She began her appellate practice at Baker Botts LLP after clerking in the Western District of Texas for the Honorable Lee Yeakel. Before practicing law, she attended Vanderbilt University and served as a math and science teacher. More recently, she served her community on the Board of Trustees for Alamo Heights Independent School District and on the State Bar's Child Abuse & Neglect Committee. After years of serving as a foster parent, she now enjoys volunteering with the National Charity League and Young Men's Service League.
Opinions by Judge Sharp (11)
Shareholder Cannot Bring Individual Conversion Claim for Corporate Property Without Derivative Pleading
In Stratton v. Hogan, the Business Court of Texas granted a Rule 91a motion to dismiss a shareholder's individual conversion claim for physical-therapy equipment that the shareholder's own pleading described as belonging to the jointly owned corporation. The court held that injuries to corporate property must be brought by the corporation or derivatively on its behalf, and that the shareholder failed to plead either derivative standing or facts showing personal ownership of the allegedly converted equipment.
TCPA Motion to Dismiss Granted Against Defamation and Tortious Interference Counterclaims Based on Litigation-Related Customer Letters
In Local Marketing v. Bennett, the Texas Business Court granted a TCPA motion to dismiss counterclaims for defamation and tortious interference, holding that letters sent to customers describing a TRO in the underlying litigation constituted communications "pertaining to" a judicial proceeding under Section 27.001(4)(A)(i). The court found that counterclaim defendants failed to establish a prima facie case for damages or defamation per se with clear and specific evidence, and awarded attorney's fees to the movant.
Contract Interpretation Principles Govern Exclusive-Use Storage and Ship-or-Pay Deficiency Calculations in Crude-Oil Terminal Dispute
In DK Trading & Supply v. Wink to Webster Pipeline, the Texas Business Court granted partial summary judgment on cross-motions, holding that a terminal services agreement unambiguously requires exclusive allocation of two tanks for the plaintiff's use, that a ship-or-pay clause permits crediting all crude oil shipped when calculating deficiency payments regardless of payment method, but that claims for the earliest disputed invoices are barred by the plaintiff's failure to satisfy a contractual condition precedent requiring timely written notice. The decision applies foundational Texas contract-construction principles to resolve disputes over storage exclusivity, deficiency-payment calculations, and notice requirements in midstream energy agreements.
Course-of-Performance Evidence Inadmissible to Construe Unambiguous Oil and Gas Farmout Agreement
In May v. INEOS USA Oil & Gas, the Business Court of Texas struck post-execution course-of-performance evidence offered by mineral-interest plaintiffs seeking to prove a well-by-well payout calculation under a farmout agreement, holding that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible when contract language is susceptible to only one reasonable meaning. The ruling follows the court's earlier determination that the contractually defined 'Payout' is triggered only by an Earning Well and calculated based on aggregated cost recovery, not on a well-by-well basis.
Fee Simple Determinable in Farmout Agreements: Business Court Construes Eagle Ford Shale Contracts as Upfront Conveyance, Not Conditional Assignment
In May v. INEOS USA Oil & Gas, the Business Court of Texas Fourth Division addressed whether a 2009 farmout agreement conveyed Eagle Ford Shale leases upfront as a fee simple determinable or merely granted the right to earn property later, and whether earned-acreage provisions operate as special limitations affecting property rights or as covenants creating only breach-of-contract claims. The court's partial grant of summary judgment resolves fundamental ambiguities in farmout structure and reversion mechanics that frequently generate disputes in shale-play development agreements.
Business Court Finds Jurisdiction Over Aiding-and-Abetting and Intellectual-Property Claims Despite Absence of Standalone Causes of Action
In Alamo Title Company v. WFG National Title Company, the Texas Business Court held that allegations of a former president's new company aiding and abetting his fiduciary breach satisfied Section 25A.004(b)(5)'s jurisdictional requirement, and that repeated allegations of misappropriated business information invoked Section 25A.004(d)(4)'s intellectual-property clause even without a standalone trade-secret claim. The court applied its balance-shifting framework to find the defendant's removal notice pleading more than five million dollars in controversy satisfied the amount-in-controversy threshold where plaintiff offered no rebuttal.
Partial Settlement Does Not Divest Business Court of Jurisdiction Once Properly Invoked
In Ornelas v. Herrera, the Business Court's Fourth Division held that agreed dismissal of claims against most defendants did not reduce the jurisdictional amount in controversy, which is fixed at the suit's commencement based on the plaintiff's pleadings. The court applied Bland ISD v. Blue to conclude that absent proof of fraud or sham pleading, the allegations in the pleadings control the jurisdictional determination.
Rule 91a Motion Denied Where Partnership Dissolution Pleadings Satisfy Notice Standard
In Hensarling v. Carmichael, the Business Court's Fourth Division held it had subject-matter jurisdiction over a partnership dissolution claim because the plaintiff sought dissolution of the entire partnership, satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement even without seeking monetary damages. The court also addressed whether a nonsuit filed two days before the hearing prevented it from ruling on defendants' pending Rule 91a motion to dismiss.
Landfill Royalty Dispute Survives Summary Judgment on Contract Interpretation of 'Operated On' Property Language
In Arnold v. Blue Ridge Landfill, the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment in a royalty payment dispute turning on whether contractual language requiring payments on revenues for "final disposal of solid waste in the sanitary landfill operated on the Property" encompasses disposal occurring in portions of the landfill not physically located on the Property. The ruling preserves plaintiff's claim that the royalty obligation extends beyond the strict geographic boundaries of the Property itself.
Business Court Holds Removal Statute Bars Partial Claim Removal and Applies Commencement Date to Original Petition
In Sebastian v. Durant, the Business Court remanded a derivative action after concluding that Section 8 of House Bill 19 fixes an action's commencement date at the filing of the original petition regardless of subsequent joinder, and that Chapter 25A permits removal of entire actions only—not individual claims. The ruling clarifies critical temporal and scope-of-removal questions under the court's enabling legislation.
Business Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Pre-Effective-Date Cases Despite Party Consent
In Jorrie v. AL Global Services, 2024 Tex. Bus. 4, the Business Court sua sponte remanded a 2018 commercial dispute removed from district court with full party consent, holding that Chapter 25A does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction over cases commenced before the Business Court's September 1, 2024 effective date. The decision establishes that the Business Court's statutory jurisdiction operates prospectively only, regardless of party agreement to transfer.